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Essay 
Ad Hoc Constitutional Reform in the UK 
ALISON L. YOUNG 
The UK Constitution has recently witnessed upheaval, most of it relating to 
the UK’s exit from the European Union and its consequences. The Constitution 
seems to be being pulled in opposite directions across three specific axes: the 
extent to which courts can control acts of the Government and determine 
constitutional issues; whether the UK Constitution rests on parliamentary or 
popular sovereignty; and whether the balance of power in Westminster belongs to 
the Government or to Parliament. This Essay argues that recent events illustrate 
the problems of informal constitutional reform. Changes appear to be made on an 
ad hoc basis to resolve specific issues rather than being based on a specific long-
term design for the constitution. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, for 
example, was enacted to facilitate a coalition Government, but was then applied to 
a minority Government which had to enact decisions on which there was little 
political consensus, leading to calls for its repeal when its provisions appeared to 
create a political impasse. The growing role of the UK courts has been called into 
question, with two recent independent reviews. This, in turn, has led to a lack of 
legal certainty, as well as a growing lack of legitimacy as these reforms take place 
in court decisions, or through quickly-enacted legislation, with little if any broader 
mandate from citizens. Whilst this may not be resolved by the enactment of a 
written constitution, it does question whether the UK Constitution is fit for purpose 
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Ad Hoc Constitutional Reform in the UK 
ALISON L. YOUNG * 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Professor Kay drew on his extensive research on formal and 
informal mechanisms of constitutional change to analyse a series of 
changes in the United Kingdom (UK) constitution.1 His work focused on 
the extent to which the UK’s understanding of parliamentary sovereignty 
had changed in the light of recent constitutional reforms. In particular, he 
looked at: the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU), the Human 
Rights Act 1998, the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, the growth in judicial review through the use of common law 
principles to provide more thorough controls over the executive and, 
potentially, possible future checks on Acts of Parliament.2 His concern was 
not to evaluate the direction of travel of these modifications, but the 
manner through which they had been achieved. Were these constitutional 
changes made in a legitimate manner? 
In the few years since Kay’s assessment there have been even more 
fundamental modification. Yet more lurk on the horizon as the UK leaves 
the European Union. Moreover, yet more constitutional reforms were 
promised in the manifesto of the Conservative Party, which secured a large 
majority government in the December 12, 2019 general election.3 This 
Essay will use Kay’s framework of constitutional change to evaluate the 
extent to which the UK constitution has evolved over the last decade, 
drawing on and extending Kay’s analysis. It will argue that there is no 
clear direction of travel. Rather, modifications potentially push the UK 
constitution in two competing directions. After providing a brief account of 
these changes, it will evaluate how they illustrate the dangers of ad hoc, 
                                                                                                                     
* Sir David Williams Professor of Public Law, University of Cambridge and Fellow of Robinson 
College. 
1 Richard S. Kay, Changing the United Kingdom Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, in 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW 98–99 (Rawlings et al. eds., 2013). 
2 Id. at 98–102. 
3 William Booth et al., U.K. Election: Boris Johnson Wins Majority, While Jeremy Corbin Says 
He Won’t Lead Another General Election Campaign, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2019, 10:31 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/uk-general-election-2019/2019/12/12/cc5ecb98-17ae-
11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html; CONSERVATIVE & UNIONIST PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE AND 
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informal constitutional reform. Whatever direction of travel the UK 
constitution embarks upon, we would do well to learn the lessons of the 
dangers of informal constitutional reform Kay has so expertly illuminated.   
I. A DECADE OF CONSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL 
Kay commented on four major areas in which parliamentary 
sovereignty has been placed under strain, if not limited. This Essay will 
focus on three of these four, all of which have seen further changes over 
the last decade: the UK’s membership in the EU, judicial review, and the 
Human Rights Act. Of these three, two now appear to place parliamentary 
sovereignty under greater strain. All three could be potentially reversed in 
the near future.  
The most dramatic volte-face concerns the UK’s membership in the 
EU. UK courts, until exit day, enjoyed a power to disapply legislation 
which directly contravenes directly effective provisions of EU law.4 The 
clearest example is the  Supreme Court’s decision in Benkharbouche.5 
Benkharbouche, a Moroccan national, had been employed at the Sudanese 
embassy in London as a housekeeper and cook for the ambassador.6 
Following her dismissal, she brought a claim for unfair dismissal, a failure 
to pay the minimal wage, and a breach of the Working Time Regulations, 
which implemented the EU’s Working Time Directive.7 However, the 
State Immunity Act 1978 had been interpreted to provide the Embassy 
with immunity from employment claims brought by non-UK nationals.8 As 
such, it appeared that Benkharbouche would be unable to bring a legal 
action.  
However, the Supreme Court concluded that this effective blanket ban 
breached Article 47 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, which provides that “everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal.”9 The EU Charter can apply in the UK provided 
that this is within the scope of EU law.10 In this instance, the Working 
Time Regulations implemented EU law. As such, the effective blanket ban 
meant that Benkharbouche had no access to court and no ability to obtain 
an effective remedy for a potential breach of her EU rights under the 
                                                                                                                     
4 Regina v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame, Ltd. [1990] AC 2466 (HL) 2473 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
5 Benkharbouche v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
6 Id. at 2–3. 
7 Id.; The Working Time Regulations, HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., https://www.hse.gov.uk/contact/ 
faqs/workingtimedirective.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
8 Benkharbouche, [2017] UKSC 62 at 43. 
9 Id. at 46. 
10 Id. 
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Working Time Directive. In order to ensure that Benkharbouche’s Charter 
right was not breached, the Court disapplied the provision of the State 
Immunity Act 1978, enabling Benkharbouche to bring her claim for a 
breach of the Working Time Regulations.11 In the words of Lord Sumption, 
“a conflict between EU law and English domestic law must be resolved in 
favour of the former, and the latter must be disapplied.”12 The 
disapplication of legislation is, to put it mildly, difficult to reconcile with 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
However, just as the constitution moved in one direction, other events 
move it firmly in the other. On Thursday, June 23, 2016, a referendum was 
held to determine the UK’s continued membership in the EU.13 51.9% of 
those who participated in the referendum voted to leave, with 48.1% voting 
to remain.14 The voters in England and Wales voted to leave the EU, with 
those in Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to remain.15 The UK left the 
EU on January 31, 2020.  The transition, or implementation period, 
regulated by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, 
ended at 11pm on 31 December 2020. The UK now has a new Cooperation 
and Trade Agreement with the EU, implemented by the hastily enacted 
European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020.16 The European 
Communities Act 1972, which provided the means through which UK law 
incorporated EU law into domestic law, was repealed on exit day.17 Its 
provisions were then temporarily revived to provide for the direct effect 
and supremacy of those aspects of EU law the UK was required to 
continue to abide by until the end of the implementation period, under the 
terms of the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement with the EU.18 At the end of the 
implementation period, those provisions of EU law in force at the end of 
the implementation period are now part of domestic law, referred to as 
“retained EU law.”19 The supremacy of retained EU law continues, but 
only as it concerns legislation enacted prior to the end of the 
                                                                                                                     
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Nigel Farage Says Leave Win Marks UK ‘Independence Day’, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36613238. 
14 EU Referendum Results, BBC NEWS, https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/ 
eu_referendum/results (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
15 Id. 
16 Tom Edgington, Brexit: What Is the Transition Period?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50838994. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, 
c. 1, § 33 (U.K.), prevents Ministers from agreeing to an extension to the implementation period. 
However, there would be nothing to prevent the Government from quickly enacting legislation to 
empower a Minister to agree to such an extension were this deemed to be necessary. 
17 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 1 (UK). 
18 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, c. 1, § 1–2, (UK).  
19 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 6 (UK).  
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implementation period.20 Moreover, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is no longer part of domestic law.21 In effect, this reverses the 
impact of EU law on parliamentary sovereignty. If retained EU law 
disapplies or overrides domestic legislation after the end of the 
implementation period, this is because it is an example of later legislation 
overriding earlier legislation.22 The only exception applies to aspects of the 
Withdrawal Agreement that continue to have both direct effect and 
supremacy – notably the provisions regarding the protection of the rights 
of EU citizens residing in the UK and the Northern Ireland Protocol.23 In 
addition, the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 
recognises that “the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign”24 
notwithstanding “directly applicable or directly effective EU law,” which 
will continue during and after the end of the implementation period.25  
Decisions of the UK courts towards the end of the last decade have 
further strengthened common law controls over the executive. One of the 
main ways in which we have seen the courts developing even stronger 
common law controls over the executive has been through the application 
of the principle of legality. Recent caselaw not only illustrates the extent to 
which the courts are willing to read down legislation in order to protect 
fundamental common law rights, but also exemplifies the expansion of this 
principle, so that it now underpins other aspects of judicial review. In 
addition, there are further dicta suggesting limits on parliamentary 
sovereignty. The clearest illustration of the development of common law 
principles of judicial review can be found in two recent Supreme Court 
cases. The first concerns ouster clauses: clauses designed to make 
decisions of administrative bodies or inferior courts or tribunals immune 
from actions for judicial review by the high court and above. The second 
was a judicial review of the prerogative power of prorogation. 
In Privacy International, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
determine the scope of an ouster clause designed to remove jurisdiction of 
the high court over decisions of the Investigative Powers Tribunal (IPT).26 
The clause states that “determinations, awards, orders and other decisions 
of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) 
shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.”27 
                                                                                                                     
20 Id. § 5.  
21 Id.  
22 HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, EUROPEAN UNION 
(WITHDRAWAL) BILL 9TH REPORT OF SESSION 2017–19, HL 69, at 18–19 (UK). 
23 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 1 (UK), section 7A. 
24 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, c. 1, § 38.1 (UK). 
25 Id. § 38.2. 
26 R (Privacy Int’l Ltd) v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22 [2]–[3] (appeal taken 
from Eng.).  
27 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 67(8) (Eng.).  
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In a decision which strongly divided the court, the Supreme Court 
concluded by four judgments to three that the ouster clause was unable to 
oust the jurisdiction of the high court over decisions of the IPT.28 
Lord Carnwath, with whom Lady Hale and Lord Kerr agreed, 
specifically referred to the law relating to the interpretation of ouster 
clauses as an exemplification of the principle of legality, focusing in 
particular on the need to uphold the rule of law to ensure access to 
justice.29 He read down the ouster clause.30 Section 67(8) specifically 
removed judicial review of the high court over determinations of the IPT as 
to whether the IPT had the jurisdiction to act.31 However, Lord Carnwath 
argued that this was only capable of removing judicial review of the high 
court over purported determinations of the IPT to act.32 In other words, if 
the IPT made a legal error when determining the scope of its jurisdiction, it 
would only make a purported and not a real determination as to whether it 
had the jurisdiction to act.33 The high court would be able to review 
decisions of the IPT and quash determinations of the IPT as to whether it 
had the jurisdiction to act when these determinations made a legal error, 
such that they were only purported and not real determinations.34  
Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Reed agreed) and Lord Wilson 
disagreed with this interpretation.35 Lord Sumption placed more emphasis 
on the wording of the clause as a whole, read in the context of the creation 
of the IPT.36 Its role was to oversee the legality of actions of security 
organisations.37 Lord Sumption concluded that the ouster clause would 
remove jurisdiction of the high court over the IPT for substantive errors 
made by the IPT when determining the scope of its jurisdiction.38 In other 
words, the IPT was given the power to substantively determine the scope 
of its own jurisdiction. However, judicial review was not removed as 
regards procedural legal errors that the IPT might make when determining 
the scope of its jurisdiction.39 Lord Wilson concluded that the ouster clause 
                                                                                                                     
28 R (Privacy Int’l Ltd), UKSC 22 at [2], [145], [147]. 
29 Id. at [100]–[101].  
30 Id. at [1]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at [40], [105]–[107]. 
33 Id. at [107]. 
34 Id. at [107]. Lord Kerr and Lady Hale concurred with Lord Carnwath’s judgment. Id. at [1]. 
Lord Lloyd-Jones also interpreted the ouster clause in this manner, although he did not concur with 
other aspects of Lord Carnwath’s judgment and specifically refused to comment on the obiter dicta of 
Lord Carnwath. Id. at [147], [168]. 
35 Id. at [212]. 
36 Id. at [204]. 
37 Id. at [169]. 
38 Id. at [205]. 
39 Id.  
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had succeeded on its application to the facts of the case.40 The high court 
was not able to review a potential legal error made by the IPT when 
determining the scope of its jurisdiction.41 
In addition, dicta in Privacy International build on the existing dicta 
that there are situations in which the courts may not apply legislation42—
albeit that these were not applied in the case. As Kay remarked in his 
assessment, an obiter dictum of Lord Steyn in Jackson suggests that, in 
exceptional circumstances, courts may refuse to apply primary 
legislation.43 In Privacy International, Lord Carnwath suggested a further 
limit, again linked to the protection of the rule of law and the preservation 
of access to the courts, asserting: 
I see a strong case for holding that, consistently with the rule 
of law, binding effect cannot be given to a clause which 
purports wholly to exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
High Court to review a decision of an inferior court or 
tribunal, whether for excess or abuse of jurisdiction, or error 
of law. In all cases, regardless of the words used, it should 
remain ultimately a matter for the court to determine the 
extent to which such a clause should be upheld, having 
regard to its purpose and statutory context, and the nature and 
importance of the legal issue in question; and to determine 
the level of scrutiny required by the rule of law.44 
Lord Wilson also appeared to suggest that it would not be possible for 
legislation to remove the power of the court to determine whether an 
inferior court or tribunal had made a jurisdictional error—interpreting a 
“jurisdictional error” in the narrow sense as an error as to the precise scope 
of jurisdiction of the tribunal or inferior court, as opposed to the wider 
sense where all legal errors are included within the definition of a 
jurisdictional error. 45 
There is also growing evidence of the Supreme Court taking on a 
larger role in the protection of the constitution, ensuring that the executive 
acts are in line with fundamental constitutional principles of the common 
law. The most striking example is found in the recent decision of R 
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. at [217]. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at [144] (suggesting that there are certain circumstances in which courts are not 
obligated to apply primary legislation). 
43 Jackson v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [80], [85] (appeal taken from Eng.); AXA Gen. 
Ins. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [50] (appeal taken from Scot.); Moohan v. Lord Advocate 
[2014] UKSC 67, [34] (appeal taken from Scot.).  
44  R (Privacy Int’l Ltd), UKSC 22 at [144]. 
45 Id. at [150]. 
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(Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate General (Scotland).46 The 
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the Prime Minister’s advice to 
the Monarch to prorogue Parliament was ultra vires.47 Consequently, as far 
as the law was concerned, Parliament had never been prorogued.48 The 
scope of the prerogative power to prorogue was determined by the 
common law. In particular, the prerogative power of prorogation was 
restricted by two fundamental constitutional principles—parliamentary 
sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. These two principles placed 
a specific limit on the prerogative power of prorogation. Prorogation is 
unlawful if it “has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without 
reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its 
constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the 
supervision of the executive.”49 When this occurs, the court will intervene 
“if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.”50  
On the facts, Parliament was prorogued for an exceptionally long 
time—five weeks—when prorogation to allow for a new Queen’s Speech 
normally only took a few days.51 Moreover, the prorogation was for a 
period of five weeks of what was, at the time, eight remaining weeks prior 
to the UK’s exit from the European Union.52 Parliament was required to 
play a role during this constitutionally important time.53 As the Prime 
Minister had not provided any reason for this extensive prorogation, the 
prorogation was unlawful.  
The case provides further support for the growing role of the common 
law in ensuring constitutional government and maintaining the rule of law 
through placing common law controls on the power of the executive, be 
they derived from legislation or from the prerogative. However, this too 
hangs in the balance. The Conservative Party manifesto promises to 
establish a Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission,54 a promise 
also found in the first Queen’s Speech of the new majority Conservative 
Government.55 This Commission will be tasked with examining “the 
relationship between the Government, Parliament and the courts; the 
                                                                                                                     
46 R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate Gen. for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [61]–[62] 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
47 Id. at [61]. 
48 Id. at [62], [70].  
49 R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate Gen. for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [50] 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
50 Id.  
51 Id. at [17], [56]. 
52 Id. at [56]. 
53 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 13 (UK). 
54 THE CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY MANIFESTO 2019, supra note 3, at 48. 
55 Queen Elizabeth II, Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech to Both Houses of Parliament (Dec. 
19, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-december-
2019).  
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functioning of the Royal Prerogative . . . and access to justice for ordinary 
people.”56 Moreover, the manifesto promises to “ensure that judicial 
review is available to protect the rights of the individuals against an 
overbearing state, while ensuring that it is not abused to conduct politics by 
another means or to create needless delays.”57 The manifesto includes a 
promise to “update the Human Rights Act” to “ensure that there is a proper 
balance between the rights of individuals, our vital national security and 
effective government.”58 The Conservative Government appointed a panel 
to carry out the Independent Review of Administrative Law, which 
reported on 18 March 2021,59 and a differently composed panel to instigate 
an Independent Review of the Human Rights Act, which is due to report in 
the summer of 2021.60  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION LEADING TO A POTENTIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT  
In addition to these changes, it is becoming clear that the UK 
Constitution is being pulled in two different directions along three potential 
axes. The first axis is clearly illustrated by the case law discussed in the 
previous section.61 It concerns the growing role of the court in the control 
over actions of the executive and, potentially, the legislature. Have the 
courts gone too far in developing these principles, effectively challenging 
the role of parliamentary sovereignty as the key principle of the UK 
Constitution? In particular, have the courts developed a new key role in 
protecting the UK Constitution, ensuring that the Government acts within 
the scope of the Constitution as defined by fundamental principles of the 
common law in addition to ensuring the executive acts within the proper 
legal scope of its powers? If so, can we understand the proposed potential 
constitutional modifications as a means of moving the UK Constitution in 
the opposite direction on this axis?  
The second and potentially more fundamental axis concerns the very 
nature of the UK Constitution and the identification of its key component. 
Is the UK Constitution based on the sovereignty of the people or on the 
sovereignty of Parliament? This tension has been illustrated most 
dramatically following the outcome of the Brexit referendum.62 While the 
                                                                                                                     
56 THE CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY MANIFESTO 2019, supra note 3, at 48. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Ministry of Justice, Open Consultation: Judicial Review Reform, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ consultations/judicial-review-reform (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
60 Independent Human Rights Act Review, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/independent-
human-rights-act-review (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
61 See supra Part I (discussing efforts to maintain rule of law and access to the courts). 
62 See Holly Ellyatt, UK Formally Leaves the European Union and Begins Brexit Transition 
Period, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2020, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/31/brexit-day-uk-formally-
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referendum gave rise to a majority vote in favour of the UK’s exit from the 
European Union, the same could not be said of the majority of MPs in the 
Westminster Parliament or of the then-existing Government.63 This tension 
came to a head in particular in 2019, which saw three major Governmental 
defeats when the House of Commons exercised their power under Section 
13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act of 2018 to reject the then 
Prime Minister Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement with the EU.64  
2019 also saw the enactment of two Private Members’ Bills which 
became legislation through innovative uses of the Standing Order Rules. 
The first successfully amended a business motion, which had been 
proposed by the Government, in order to suspend Standing Order 14, the 
Standing Order that prioritises Government business in the House of 
Commons.65 The second used Standing Order 24, which empowers MPs to 
propose urgent motions, also to suspend Standing Order 14 and propose an 
alternative business motion.66 It had been previously assumed that 
Standing Order 24 could only be used for neutral motions, not for those 
that had a substantive content. Both empowered the Commons to enact all 
three stages of legislation in one day. Both were used to enact legislation 
which required the Government to seek an extension to the Article 50 
negotiation period in order to prevent the UK from leaving the EU with no 
deal.67 A series of defeats, over both measures designed to facilitate the 
UK’s exit from the EU and to hold an early parliamentary general 
election,68 eventually led the then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, to 
propose and push through legislation to partially repeal the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act 2011, enabling the holding of an early parliamentary 
                                                                                                                     
leaves-the-european-union.html (discussing the political, economic, and societal divisions Brexit has 
caused). 
63 Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. 
64 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 13 (UK). See Theresa May’s Brexit Deal Is 
Rejected by U.K. Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/03/29/world/europe/theresa-may-brexit.html (discussing Parliament’s rejection of Theresa May’s 
withdrawal plan). 
65 See Standing Orders of the House of Commons 2018, c. 14 (UK) (delineating government 
business practices). 
66 Id. at c. 24. 
67 The first gave rise to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 and the second the European 
Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019. European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, c. 16 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/16/enacted/data.pdf; European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) 
Act 2019, c. 26 (UK). See ARTICLE 50 EXTENSION, INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/printpdf/7569 (discussing the process of Article 50 
extensions). 
68 The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 enables the holding of an early general election when 
two thirds of the House vote in favor of an early parliamentary general election. Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, § 2 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/enacted/data.pdf. 
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general election on 12 December 2019.69 The large swing towards the 
Conservative Party can be interpreted as an indication from the electorate 
that Parliament was failing to act in line with the wishes of the majority of 
those who voted in favour of Brexit in the 2016 referendum. Regardless of 
one’s views on Brexit, the events of 2019 provide further evidence of a rift 
between the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of Parliament. 
How far can the UK continue to be based upon the sovereignty of 
Parliament when there is an emerging practice—some would even argue a 
constitutional convention—of the use of referendums to decide major 
constitutional issues such as Scottish independence,70 the European 
Union,71 and electoral systems?72 
The above tension also demonstrates a third axis—the nature of the 
UK’s parliamentary democracy. David Howarth describes this as a tension 
between Westminster and Whitehall visions of democracy.73 The 
distinction turns upon different understandings of the relative role of the 
legislature and the executive. Under the Whitehall vision, the role of the 
legislature is to support the Government, which normally enjoys a majority 
in the Commons.74 As such, the role of the opposition is to propose an 
alternative form of Government ready for the next general election, as 
opposed to providing a detailed scrutiny of legislation or the actions of the 
Government.75 Under the Westminster vision of democracy, the role of the 
legislature is different. The opposition is not there merely to propose a 
potential alternative Government, but also to provide detailed scrutiny over 
legislation, including aiming to push for different policy outcomes, as well 
as to provide detailed scrutiny over the actions of the executive.76  
In addition to the events described above, in the 2017–2019 
parliamentary session, opposition and backbench MPs acted together, 
obtaining a series of policy modifications of the European Union 
                                                                                                                     
69 See Early Parliamentary General Elections Bill, 800 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2019) (UK), 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2019-10-30/debates/37AAC81F-A393-44B3-
998522A76FA1D3D1/EarlyParliamentaryGeneralElectionBill (discussing Boris Johnson’s efforts 
towards repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in order to withdraw the UK from the EU). 
70 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, (ASP 14) § 1 (Scot.).  
71 See The Referendum Act 1975, No. 801 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1975/801/pdfs/uksi_19750801_en.pdf (discussing procedures for 
holding future referendums).  
72 Parliamentary Voting and Constituencies Act 2011, c. 1 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/1/part/1/enacted (discussing voting procedures in 
parliamentary elections). 
73 David Howarth, Westminster versus Whitehall: Two Incompatible Views of the Constitution, 
U.K. CONST. L. ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2019), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/04/10/david-howarth-
westminster-versus-whitehall-two-incompatible-views-of-the-constitution/ (discussing the conflicting 
views of UK parliamentary roles).  
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
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(Withdrawal) Act 2018.77 The Miller/Cherry decision can be interpreted as 
the court’s endorsement of a Westminster as opposed to a Whitehall vision 
of democracy.78 The principle of parliamentary accountability draws on the 
understanding that the Government only holds power to the extent that it 
enjoys the confidence of the House of Commons.79 The Government is 
accountable to the House of Commons which, in turn, is accountable to the 
people.80  
All of these tensions are arising not just because of Brexit, but also 
because of the informal nature of the UK Constitution. The lack of a 
codified constitution does not entail that the UK has no written sources of 
constitutional rules. Nor does it necessarily entail a greater difficulty in 
determining the content of constitutional provisions. More fundamentally, 
it demonstrates how the UK constitution is continually evolving. Key 
constitutional principles, such as: the nature of constituent power; the 
definition of the state; the separation of powers; and the specific 
delineation of the relative powers of distinct governmental institutions, are 
either under-developed or fluid. They do not provide a clear anchor to the 
UK constitution, a specific formal means of constitutional modification, or 
guidelines as to the direction of travel of constitutional developments. 
Consequently, events like Brexit can place the UK constitution under 
considerable strain, with the resolution of these tensions dependent upon 
the political persuasion of the Government, which holds power at the 
moment in time when these tensions become apparent.  
III. FORMAL AND INFORMAL MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Kay’s work provides the benchmark for distinguishing between, and 
evaluating, different forms of constitutional change. It remains the case 
that it is hard to distinguish between formal and informal modifications of 
the UK constitution. This is despite developments in UK constitutional law 
establishing a category of ‘constitutional’ statutes. Provisions of 
constitutional legislation have to be overturned by clear, specific, or even 
express words. Their provisions will not be overturned by implication 
alone.81 Moreover, there is an emerging difference in the procedures used 
                                                                                                                     
77 EU Withdrawal Bill: Amendments and Debates, INST. FOR GOV’T, 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu-withdrawal-bill-amendments-and-debates. 
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for the enactment of constitutional legislation. The committee stage as 
applied to constitutional legislation normally takes place before a 
Committee of the whole House, as opposed to a Public Bill Committee.82 
However, as will be discussed below, the enactment of the Early 
Parliamentary General Elections Act 2019 suggests that the then 
Government, if not the House as a whole, is less accepting of the need for 
differential treatment of constitutional and ordinary legislation. 
Constitutional legislation can be enacted in haste when required – note in 
particular the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020, which was 
enacted in one day, to implement a long and complex Treaty, agreed six 
days earlier, which Parliament was not required to approve in order for the 
Treaty to  be ratified.83  
Whilst there are suggestions of differential treatment of constitutional 
as opposed to legislative change, the UK constitution is still predominantly 
changed in an informal manner. As such, constitutional modifications 
display the disadvantages of the use of these informal means of change. 
Kay argues that there are three main disadvantages of informal 
constitutional modifications. First, informal modifications are ad hoc. They 
do not form part of a deliberate design. Consequently, constitutional 
modifications enacted informally often lack an element of deep reflection 
and choice. Second, there can be a lack of certainty to informal 
constitutional amendment. This lack of certainty undermines the very 
purpose of constitutionalism. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that 
power is constrained by constitutional principles if we are unable to 
identify the very principles designed to uphold constitutional government. 
Third, there is a lack of legitimacy in the manner in which informal 
constitutional change is achieved.84 Formal constitutional change engages 
citizens as well as institutions, recognising the role of the people as part of 
constituent power. Informal constitutional change frequently fails to 
provide a role for the people. Moreover, it may fail to fully engage all of 
the institutions of government.85 
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This section will argue that the last decade of constitutional change 
illustrates all three of these weaknesses. The problems of constitutional 
change that lack a clear design and the dangers of unintended 
consequences of constitutional change are illustrated starkly by the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 and recent political events. The problems 
of the lack of certainty are illustrated through the Miller/Cherry decision. 
Both illustrate a potential lack of legitimacy, as do more recent examples 
of legislative changes and interpretations of Standing Orders, all of which 
played a role in the particularly dramatic year of 2019. 
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS ACT 
2011 
Prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, legislation only 
proscribed a maximum length of Parliament, with the Parliaments Act 
1911 fixing this at five years.86 Parliament could be dissolved by the 
Monarch, exercising her prerogative power.87 In practice, this placed a 
discretion in the hands of the Government to advise the Monarch to 
dissolve Parliament at a time which would be perceived to provide an 
electoral advantage to his or her political party.88 The 2011 Act replaced 
this prerogative power with a series of statutory provisions. It fixes 
parliamentary terms to five years, setting the dates of general elections.89 It 
also provided for two means through which an early parliamentary general 
election could take place. First, it would be possible for an early general 
election to be held following a vote of no confidence in the Government. If 
a vote of no confidence succeeds, there follows a period of fourteen days in 
which an alternative government could be formed, or confidence could be 
regained in the current government. If a government were to obtain a vote 
of confidence from the Commons in that fourteen-day period, then it would 
become the new government and continue to the end of that parliamentary 
term.90 If not, then Parliament is dissolved and a general election takes 
place. Second, an early parliamentary general election takes place if 
                                                                                                                     
Rewrite the Constitution, 2015 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 29–30 (discussing the process of changing the 
Constitution through judicial decision making); Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s 
Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 31, 33–34 (2016) (discussing Wade’s theory on 
parliamentary sovereignty).  
86 Parliament Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 13, § 7 (Eng.), replaced by, Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011, c. 14, § 7(2), sch. para. 4 (Eng.). 
87 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 5 (Eng.). 
88 See ANNE TWOMEY, THE VEILED SCEPTRE: RESERVE POWERS OF HEADS OF STATE IN 
WESTMINSTER SYSTEMS (2018). 
89 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, § 1 (Eng.). 
90 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, §§ 2(3)–(5) (Eng.).  
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two-thirds of the 650 members of the House of Commons votes in favour 
of an early parliamentary general election.91 
This “change of the highest constitutional significance” was enacted by 
ordinary legislation.92 Its enactment also aimed to resolve a particular 
constitutional problem: fixing parliamentary terms as part of the coalition 
agreement between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives who 
formed a Government from 2010 to 2015, as well as responding to other 
long-term calls for reform.93 The Act lengthened parliamentary terms in 
practice, in addition to proscribing a longer term than is used for the 
devolved legislatures, whose terms are fixed at four years. Moreover, it 
removed any remaining personal role of the Monarch in the dissolution of 
Parliament; replaced a prerogative with a statutory power; placed votes of 
no confidence on a statutory footing these having been previously 
determined by constitutional convention; had consequences for the 
parliamentary terms of the devolved legislatures who were unable to hold 
an election on the same year as an election to the Westminster Parliament; 
and provided for an innovative use of a supermajority within the 
Commons.94 It also altered the balance of power between the legislature 
and the executive. Prior to the Act, it was possible for the Prime Minister 
to use the vote of no confidence to prevent backbench MPs from voting 
against the government’s wishes. Although rebellious backbench MPs may 
be willing to defeat governmental policies, they may be less willing to vote 
against the government were that to trigger a general election.95 The Act 
was also seen as further evidence of a modification of the nature of the 
UK’s parliamentary democracy, moving from a majoritarian to a consensus 
model, given the way in which the Act curtailed the powers of the prime 
minister, reduced the dominance of the executive over the legislature, and 
potentially created circumstances under which it may be more likely that 
elections would produce minority Governments or hung Parliaments.96  
However, as the events of 2019 illustrate starkly, its enactment gave 
rise to unintended consequences. In 2019, Theresa May’s government 
                                                                                                                     
91 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, §§ 2(1)–(2) (Eng.).  
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faced three defeats on major policy issues.97 These arose through the 
operation of section thirteen of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018, which required the Commons to vote in favour of the Withdrawal 
Agreement and the Political Declaration on the Future Relationship 
between the UK and the EU in order to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement.98 
The Commons voted against the agreement three times: on 15 January by 
432 to 202 votes; on 12 March by 319 to 242 votes; and on 29 March by 
344 to 286 votes.99 The first vote was the largest ever defeat of a 
Government in the modern era of universal suffrage to Westminster. Such 
defeats would normally have led either to a Government being pressured 
into resigning, the importance of the policy issues on which the 
Government was defeated almost being regarded as indirect votes of 
confidence, or may well have given rise to a vote of no confidence. The 
first governmental defeat did give rise to a vote of no confidence under the 
provisions of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. It took place the next day 
and was defeated by 306 votes to 325.100 Whilst backbench MPs may have 
been prepared to vote against governmental policy on the Withdrawal 
Agreement, they were not prepared to vote against the Government as a 
whole. 
Tensions grew as the government faced further defeats. The failure to 
secure a vote in favour of the Withdrawal Agreement led to the resignation 
of Theresa May as leader of the Conservative Party, to be replaced as 
leader, and thereby as Prime Minister, by Boris Johnson.101 Johnson’s 
government also faced repeated defeats. Prior to the September prorogation 
of Parliament, Boris Johnson twice sought to obtain a vote for an early 
parliamentary general election.102 Despite obtaining a majority on both 
occasions, he did not obtain enough votes to obtain the requisite two-thirds 
of all Members of Parliament.103 Boris Johnson tried, and failed, again to 
obtain a vote in favour of an early parliamentary general election on 28 
                                                                                                                     
97 These were the three votes rejecting the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement with the EU. See 652 
Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 1122–25 (UK); 656 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 291–95 
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98 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 13A (UK).  
99 See 652 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 1122–25 (UK); 656 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) 
col. 291–95 (UK); 657 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 771–75 (UK). 
100 652 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 1269–73 (UK). 
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October.104 The Government then introduced a bill to propose an early 
general election immediately after losing the vote.105 This bill was enacted 
in the House of Commons on the 29 October, and passed through the 
House of Lords on 30 October with the House of Lords agreeing to 
modifying their Standing Orders to enable the legislation to be enacted so 
quickly.106  
The Early Parliamentary General Elections Act 2019 (2019 Act) 
received royal assent on 31 October.107 Its provisions partially repealed the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (2011 Act), providing for an early 
parliamentary general election to be held on 12 December.108 Section 1(1) 
of the 2019 Act stated that “[a]n early parliamentary general election is to 
take place on 12 December 2019 in consequence of the passing of this 
Act,” with section 1(2) explaining that 12 December was “to be treated as a 
polling day appointed under section 2(7) of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011.”109 The 2019 Act did not specifically state that the early 
parliamentary general election would take place notwithstanding the 
requirements of the 2011 Act, which only allowed for an early 
parliamentary general election following a two-thirds vote of the whole 
House in favour of an early parliamentary general election or a successful 
vote of no confidence.110 This could be explained by the fact that both the 
2011 and the 2019 Act were examples of constitutional legislation, making 
it possible for later constitutional legislation to partially impliedly repeal 
earlier legislation, or by reading the 2019 Act as a specific exception to the 
2011 Act. What is clear, however, is that the government did not feel the 
need to provide for such a clause or even to discuss whether such a clause 
was needed given the general acceptance that the 2011 Act is an example 
of a constitutional statute. 
The events of 2019 clearly illustrate the unintended consequence of the 
2011 Act. As Schleiter and Belu recognise, the Act is suited to and acts 
better in a consensual as opposed to a majoritarian democracy.111 Whilst 
this may have been the case during the coalition government, and should 
arguably have been the case in 2019 with a conservative minority 
government, the Conservative government was unwilling to act in a 
consensual manner. The backdrop of Brexit, the policy commitment of the 
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government to implement the outcome of the referendum and ensure the 
UK’s exit from the EU, and the unique mechanism found in Section 13 of 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (2018 Act) empowering the 
Commons to have more of a say in the ratification of Treaties, including 
provisions designed to provide a means for the Commons to guide the 
Government,112 provided an unusual setting which placed the provisions of 
the 2011 Act under strain. Whilst the 2018 Act may have marked a move 
to more consensual politics, it was clear that the behaviour of the 
Government had not changed, resting on a majoritarian view of 
democracy. The 2011 Act became viewed as a stop-gap solution to a 
specific problem, creating what Boris Johnson referred to as a zombie 
Parliament, unable to perform what he perceived to be its job: supporting 
the Government to achieve Brexit.113 Moreover, its provisions were, 
eventually, easily removed; it is no wonder that the strong conservative 
majority government elected in December 2019 placed the repeal of the 
2011 Act on its manifesto, as later announced in the Queen’s speech.114  
V. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY: UNLAWFUL PROROGATION? 
The events of 2019 also illustrate the uncertainty that arises as 
constitutions change informally, undermining the extent to which 
constitutions can perform their job of maintaining the rule of law and 
ensuring governments act according to constitutional standards. The 
clearest illustration of this was R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. 
Advocate General for Scotland, which concerned the legality of the advice 
given by Boris Johnson to the Queen to prorogue Parliament.115 Gina 
Miller brought her case to the High Court in England whilst Joanna 
Cherry, a Scottish National Party (“SNP”) member of the Westminster 
Parliament, brought her case before the Scottish courts.116 Both argued that 
the advice given to the Prime Minister was unlawful, tainted by an 
improper purpose.117 Both Gina Miller and Joanna Cherry failed at first 
instance. Both the English and the Scottish courts originally concluded that 
the prerogative power of prorogation was too political and therefore was 
not justiciable.118 However, Cherry succeeded on her appeal to the Inner 
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House of the Court of Session, leading to both cases being heard together 
in the Supreme Court.119 With Parliament prorogued, and given the 
importance of the issue, both cases progressed quickly to the Supreme 
Court.  
In only its second sitting before a maximum number of eleven Justices, 
the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the advice was unlawful, 
and, in turn, that prorogation was unlawful.120 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Supreme Court reasoned differently from the lower courts: it did not 
focus on the purpose of the advice given to prorogue Parliament, but on its 
effect.121 Consequently, by focusing on the scope of the prerogative power, 
the court did not need to consider the controversial issue of whether the 
prerogative power was too political to be justiciable before the court.122 
Courts have long had the power to determine the scope of prerogative 
powers, which is set by the common law.123 The Supreme Court relied on 
two background constitutional principles which provided a limit on the 
scope of the prerogative power of prorogation: parliamentary sovereignty 
and parliamentary accountability.124 The use of both was controversial.125  
Parliamentary sovereignty is traditionally understood in terms of the 
scope of Parliament’s law-making powers.126 Parliament can enact 
legislation on any subject matter it wishes, without this being questioned in 
a court, save that it cannot bind its successors and thereby entrench 
constitutional principles.127 The Supreme Court concluded that 
parliamentary sovereignty would be harmed if there were no limits that 
could be placed on the power of the executive to prorogue Parliament.128 
This could result in Parliament being permanently prorogued, never able to 
sit and perform its functions. Regardless of whether one sees this as a valid 
or invalid interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty, it was not clear that 
parliamentary sovereignty included these aspects until recognised in this 
case.   
In addition, it is hard to find clear support in the case law for a 
principle of parliamentary accountability. Although underpinning legal 
standards and, in the words of the Supreme Court, having “been invoked 
time and again throughout the development of our constitutional and 
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administrative law, as a justification for judicial restraint as part of a 
constitutional separation of powers,” it had not previously been used in a 
court to justify a limit on a prerogative power.129 Again, it was not clear 
that parliamentary accountability would be interpreted in this manner to 
limit the prerogative power of prorogation. In addition, some regard the 
use of parliamentary accountability in this manner as evidence of the court 
enforcing a constitutional convention, despite clear case law to the 
contrary.130 
These were not the only controversial elements of the decision 
pointing to the lack of clarity surrounding key constitutional principles and 
their application, and the lack of certainty as to the scope of constitutional 
change. The Supreme Court reasoned from first principles, drawing on 
background constitutional principles to develop a specific limit on the 
prerogative power of prorogation.131 In determining that the power to 
prorogue Parliament was void, the Supreme Court provided a definitive 
application of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, which prevents courts 
from questioning proceedings in Parliament.132 Although the prorogation 
of Parliament takes place in the House, the Court concluded that it was not 
a proceeding in Parliament as the decision was made by the executive 
alone and was not a decision of either House.133 Although Parliament may 
also assert its ability to determine the scope of proceedings in Parliament, 
the Supreme Court concluded that it was for the court and the court alone 
to determine what is meant by a proceeding in Parliament, or a matter that 
was in the exclusive cognizance of Parliament.134  
It is not the place of this Essay to assess whether the decision of the 
Supreme Court was correct. It is to illustrate the uncertainty and 
controversy surrounding the decision. The decision both reinforced and 
changed the constitution. The fact that this can erode the effectiveness of 
constitutional principles to regulate executive actions is demonstrated by 
the Government’s reaction to the decision. Following the decision, 
Parliament was recalled the following day.135 The Prime Minister gave a 
statement to the House in response to the decision, asserting that he 
thought the court “was wrong to pronounce on what is essentially a 
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political question, at a time of great national controversy,” perceiving the 
case as a method to betray the will of the people and prevent Brexit.136 His 
remarks were coupled with statements that he would not comply with the 
legal requirements of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 
and would refuse to send a letter to the European Council requesting an 
extension of the Article 50 negotiation process.137 Although the Prime 
Minister did, eventually, comply with the law, he did so by sending an 
unsigned copy of the text of the letter as set out in the Appendix of the 
2019 Act, accompanied by an explanation of why the letter had been sent 
and a signed letter explaining that the letter expressed the wishes of the 
Commons, but that the policy of the Government was still to leave the EU 
on 31 October, even if this meant leaving with no deal.138  
VI. ILLEGITIMATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
This brings us to Kay’s final criticism: Modifying the constitution in 
this manner leads to a lack of legitimacy—it fails to include the people. All 
of the modifications discussed above failed to provide sufficient inclusion 
of the people. The decision to hold a referendum on Brexit followed a 
manifesto promise of one political party and was enacted through 
legislation which did not include wide pre-legislative scrutiny or 
consultation of the people.139 The same is true of the enactment of the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. Although the Miller/Cherry decision 
was televised and widely commented on by the international and national 
media, there was no public consultation regarding the content of 
background constitutional principles. The hearing also witnessed public 
protests outside the court, focusing on supporting “leave” or “remain” in 
addition to protesting that democracy had been silenced—either as the 
executive wished to prorogue Parliament, or because Parliament wished to 
silence the will of the people by failing to support Brexit.140 The only way 
the people felt they could take part in such decisions was to protest outside 
the institution charged with interpreting the constitution.  
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Moreover, constitutional change has been occurring without full 
engagement of all of the institutions of the Constitution, let alone the 
people. The most striking example is the way in which Standing Orders of 
the Commons had been interpreted. Standing Orders regulate the manner 
in which the House of Commons regulates its own internal affairs.141 
Standing Orders can be modified by a mere resolution of the House of 
Commons.142 Their interpretation and application come from the Speaker, 
who is elected by the House of Commons.143 As discussed above, in 2019, 
the Speaker interpreted Standing Orders in a manner that facilitated the 
enactment of Private Members’ Bills.144 In particular, the Speaker 
interpreted Standing Order 24, enabling an emergency debate, to allow for 
the determination of substantive issues, when previously it had been 
believed that this could only be used for neutral motions.145 Standing Order 
24 was then used to introduce a motion to suspend the application of 
Standing Order 14, which prioritized Government business.146 In effect, 
this allowed the legislature to take control from the Government.  
This modification of Standing Orders had a profound impact on the 
balance of power between the legislature and the Government, in turn 
having an impact on the UK Constitution. It is not known how far this 
precedent will be used in future, or even if this would be possible under a 
strong majority as opposed to a minority Government. This direction of 
travel may be reversed just as quickly, again with little say from the 
people. Although the Conservative party manifesto makes it clear that the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 will be repealed, it is not clear what, if 
anything, will replace it. Moreover, the membership of the Constitution, 
Democracy and Rights Commission has not been made clear, nor has its 
mandate, process of decision-making, or direction of travel. Unlike 
promises in other manifestos, there is no reference to engagement with the 
people in order to enact what may be sweeping constitutional reforms. 
Whilst the events of 2019 may have been unusual, the process of 
constitutional change with little inter-institutional involvement, and no true 
engagement with the people is likely to continue.  
                                                                                                                     
141 MP’s Guide to Procedure: Standing Orders, U.K. PARLIAMENT, 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay has demonstrated the prescience and wisdom of Kay’s 
analysis of the UK constitution. The past decade has proved to be one of 
considerable upheaval, particularly in 2019. But, this Essay does not 
necessarily argue in favour of the UK adopting a written constitution. 
Rather, it illustrates one of the many tensions at the centre of 
constitutionalism which also forms a part of Kay’s body of work on 
constitutionalism—the need to enable flexibility for constitutions to adapt 
over time whilst also ensuring that there is sufficient protection for strong 
constitutional principles against accidental, or even deliberate, erosion. The 
recent experience of the UK constitution amply demonstrates the urgency 
of effectively resolving this tension. 
 
